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“Lenity of Juries and frequency of 
Pardons are in the main a much 
greater Cruelty to a populous State or 
Kingdom, than the use of Racks and 
the most exquisite Torments.” 
– Bernard Mandeville1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Larry Laudan has made a bold proposal for improving the criminal 
justice system.  He considers the costs and benefits of a lower standard of 
proof for “serial felons.”  These persons have a greater chance to commit 
serious crimes in the future, and should, therefore, be given less opportunity 
to do so.  The standard of proof for serial felons should not be the current 
lenient standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the more severe 
standard of “clear and convincing evidence.”  Lenity of juries, Laudan finds, 
is in the main a great cruelty to the people. 
Laudan’s logic is a straightforward implication of his decision-theoretic 
framework.  The standard of proof should emerge from a calculation of costs 
and benefits in just the way John Kaplan described in his influential 1968 
paper, Decision Theory and the Fact-Finding Process.2  The jury should 
 
* Professor of Finance, Whitman School of Management of Syracuse University.  I thank 
Michael Risinger for inviting me to participate in the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium of 
“Experts, Inference and Innocence” held on the 27th and 28th of October 2017.  I thank 
Michael, Paul Cassell, and other symposium participants for comments.   
 1  1 BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES, PUBLIC 
BENEFITS 145 (1795).   
 2  John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 
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convict if and only if the expected costs of acquittal exceed the expected 
benefits.  The cost of acquittal is the probability of guilt, Pg , times the “disutility of acquitting a guilty man.”  The benefit of acquittal is one minus 
the probability of guilt (1Pg ) times the disutility of “convicting an innocent man.”  This principle yields an inequality in which the threshold 
probability of guilt—the standard of proof—depends on the ratio of the 
disutility of acquitting a guilty person to the disutility of convicting an 
innocent person.  The higher this ratio, the lower the optimal standard of 
proof.  (Following Laudan’s good example I ignore as irrelevant to the 
current discussion the otherwise important refinements found in Tribe’s 
subsequent contribution.3)  The likely costs of letting a serial offender off are 
greater than the likely costs of letting a first offender off, and so, the standard 
of proof should be lower for the serial felon. 
Laudan’s logic may seem to be a kind of scientific inevitability.  
Laudan’s subtitle calls for “empiricizing” the rules of criminal law.  
Empirical evidence subject to rational analysis yields a standard of proof that 
varies optimally with costs and benefits.  Who would argue with science, 
logic, and empirical evidence?  Laudan’s scientific analysis of costs and 
benefits seems well-crafted to make any self-respecting economist happy.  I 
am an economist.  And yet I am not happy. 
A. The Rate of False Convictions 
Laudan estimates the rate of false conviction at about 3% for violent 
felonies.4  As far as I can tell, he relies on two studies, that of Risinger5 and 
that of Gross et al.6  I think we may have reason to fear that his 3% value is 
too low.  Risinger clearly establishes his rate as a “minimum factual rate,” 
and that only for a rather narrow class of cases.  Risinger does not think the 
true rate in his class of cases likely exceeds 5%, but the calculated rate is a 
minimum and not an estimate of the true value in any class of cases.  
Similarly, Gross et al. provide a highly conservative estimate that explicitly 
excludes several known cases of “mass exoneration.”  Thus, both Risinger’s 
 
(1968).   
 3  Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).   
 4  Paul Cassell has pointed out to me that Laudan’s 3% figure does not enter his 
calculation of costs and benefits from alternative standards of proof.  But his calculation of 
differential harm from acquitting serial offenders depends on the assumption that they 
probably did the crimes they were convicted of.  It depends, therefore, on the assumption of 
a relatively low rate of false convictions, such as 3%.   
 5  D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007).   
 6  Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata 
Patil, Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
523, 523–60 (2005). 
KOPPL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  9:15 AM 
2018] COMMENT ON LAUDAN 1257 
estimate and that of Gross et al. are biased downward. 
Laudan neglects the jury study of McCabe and Purves, which yields a 
minimum possible error rate of 12.5%.7  McCabe and Purves created shadow 
juries to hear criminal cases in three British courts.  The shadow juries heard 
the same evidence as the real juries and deliberated independently.  Shadow 
juries were present in 30 cases.  In one of the cases, the real jury was hung.  
Five of the shadow juries were hung, but the researchers took the majority 
vote if at least 8 of the 12 shadow jurors agreed, leaving only one hung 
shadow jury.  Thus, two cases were eliminated from the study.  In 7 of the 
remaining 28 cases, the shadow jury and the real jury reached different 
verdicts.  Thus, the average overall error rate of the two types of juries in this 
study cannot have been less than one in eight, or 12.5%.8  This figure is an 
average overall error rate for the study and not a rate of false convictions.  It 
could be that in all seven cases the defendant was in fact guilty, so that none 
of the mistaken verdicts represent the potential for false conviction.  Of 
course, the opposite possibility seems no less possible.  And, finally, the 
juries may have been wrong in some or, theoretically, all cases in which they 
agreed.  Thus, the 12.5% rate is the minimum logically possible error rate in 
the study.  The McCabe and Purves study suggests to me that Laudan’s 3% 
estimate is too conservative. 
B. Bayesian Rational Juries 
Laudan proposes that, when the defendant is a “serial felon” judges 
should instruct juries to find the defendant guilty if the evidence against them 
is “clear and convincing.”  Otherwise, judges in criminal cases should 
instruct juries to convict only if the evidence given in court establishes guilt 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jurors will know, then, whether the defendant 
is a “serial felon” and incorporate that information into their calculations.  In 
some cases, the defendant’s history will be information the jury would not 
otherwise have had.  In other cases, it is information the jury would otherwise 
have had.9 
Let us separate the criminal record of the defendant or suspect from all 
the other evidence that fact finders will consider in Laudan’s analysis.  Let 
us imagine that information on the person’s record comes in before the rest 
 
 7  SARAH MCCABE & ROBERT PURVES, THE SHADOW JURY AT WORK 18, 19 (1974).  This 
paragraph is mostly lifted from Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System 
Creates Incentives for False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126 (2013).  
 8  See McCabe and Purves, supra note 7.  The two juries disagreed on one in four cases.  
In each such case, one jury was right and the other wrong, making the average error rate at 
least half of one in four, i.e., one in eight.  Id.   
 9  There are many exceptions in American criminal law to the common-law default rule 
that the defendant’s criminal record be excluded from trial.  See, e.g., James B. Jacobs, 
Admissibility of the Defendant’s Criminal Records at Trial, 4 BEIJING L. REV. 120–27 (2013).   
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of the evidence and consider how Bayesian-rational fact finders would 
update their “prior,” which is determined by that record.  Kaplan correctly 
infers from the mathematics of Bayesian updating that “the order in which 
evidence comes in will not affect our rational decisionmaker.”10  Thus, we 
are imagining the suspect’s record to come in first only for our convenience.  
Let the inelegant label “main evidence” identify all the evidence available to 
the jury besides whether the defendant is a serial felon.11 
Let δ be the jury’s “prior” probability of the suspect being guilty, based 
on the information whether the defendant is or is not a “serial felon.”  Then 
(1 – δ) is the “prior” probability of innocence. 
Let r be a continuous variable corresponding to the strength of the main 
evidence against the defendant.  For guilty defendants, the probability 
density function is )(rf g ; for innocent suspects, it is )(rf n .  It is tempting to say that )(rf g  is the conditional probability of r given the defendant’s guilt and )(rf n  is the conditional probability of r under the hypothesis of the defendant’s innocence.  But because we are assuming that r is a continuous 
variable, these interpretations would not be strictly correct.  The proof given 
in the appendix shows, however, that this mathematical nicety does not affect 
my argument.  We can plug these probability density function realizations 
into Bayes formula as if they were indeed conditional probabilities.  Given a 
test result r, the jury must update its belief about the likelihood of guilt.  The 
updated probability will be: 
 
)()1()(
)()|Pr(
rfrf
rf
rguilty
ng
g


           (1) 
Laudan’s proposal may now be interpreted as a twofold requirement.  
First, juries should be told whether the defendant is a serial felon even in 
those cases in which this information would have been excluded from the 
trial.  This is true because revealing the standard of proof will necessarily 
reveal whether the defendant is a serial felon. Second, for serial felons, the 
standard of proof, which is the left-hand side of equation (1), should 
correspond to “clear and convincing evidence.”  Laudan says that standard 
of proof is “more or less in the 70% range.”  But with this proposal, jurors 
would be asked to convict serial felons on main evidence that might be weak 
or, in some cases, exculpatory.  From equation (1) we can easily compute, 
 
 10  Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1085.   
 11  The mathematical part of my argument borrows (even in some of its exact wording) 
from Glen Whitman, & Roger Koppl, Rational Bias in Forensic Science, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY 
AND RISK 69 (2010).  That work, in turn, builds on Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers. Do 
Juries Meet Our Expectation?,26 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 625 (2002).  
fg /fn
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for given values of delta and standard of proof, the threshold value of above 
above which the jury should convict.  The table shows how this threshold 
value varies with δ when the standard of proof is “clear and convincing 
evidence” and when it is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 
δ Threshold value of  when when standard of 
proof is “clear and 
convincing evidence” 
Threshold value of  
when when standard of 
proof is “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” 
0 infinite infinite 
0.1 21 81 
0.2 9.33 36 
0.3 5.44 21 
0.4 3.5 13.5 
0.5 2.33 9 
0.6 1.56 6 
0.7 1.00 3.86 
0.8 0.58 2.25 
0.9 0.26 1.00 
1 0 0 
  
fg /f n fg /f n
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When the standard of proof is “clear and convincing evidence,” the threshold 
shifts from inculpatory to exculpatory when delta rises above 0.7.  Thus, a 
moderately high “prior” belief in the defendant’s guilt is sufficient to induce 
the jury to convict when the main evidence presented in court is more 
exculpatory than incriminating!  Perhaps that is a result Laudan is happy 
with.  I confess that I am not happy with such a result.  If the standard of 
proof is 0.9, that threshold is not crossed until the prior belief in the 
defendant’s guilt exceeds 0.9. 
Laudan does not address the issue whether changing the standard of 
proof will change who is arrested and put through either trial or the plea 
bargaining process.  But if it becomes easier to convict serial felons, the 
authorities will have a stronger incentive to find past felons to blame for 
unsolved crimes.  This change in behavior would seem to increase the risk 
of false convictions.  As the New York Police Department’s Schoolcraft 
scandal illustrates, we must assume that police officers and prosecutors will 
respond to incentives, just as all other humans generally do.12  Who gets 
swept into the net of justice should be endogenous to our model, not 
exogenous.  I note elsewhere, “In the theory of experts, as in all of social 
science, all agents must be modeled if we are to minimize the risk of 
proposing policies that would require some actors to behave in ways that are 
inconsistent with their incentives or beyond human capabilities.”13  In this 
case, it would be inconsistent with their incentives if police were to ignore 
ease of conviction or otherwise clearing the case when deciding whom to 
arrest. 
I think Laudan underestimates the rate of false conviction in the United 
States today.  And his proposal for a lower standard of proof would seem to 
sometimes encourage juries to return a guilty verdict when the “main 
evidence” in more exculpatory than inculpatory.  I am, therefore, unhappy 
with his proposal notwithstanding its foundations in a scientific analysis of 
costs and benefits, which I, as an economist, can appreciate.  In the United 
States today, Lenity of Juries is in the main a much lesser Cruelty to a 
populous State or Kingdom than Larry Laudan would have us believe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12  See Koppl & Sacks, supra note 7.   
 13  KOPPL, ROGER, EXPERT FAILURE 80 (Cambridge University Press 2018).   
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APPENDIX:  PROOF OF UPDATED PROBABILITY OF GUILT 
To find the probability of guilt given a specific test result rˆ , we need 
to update the prior probability of guilt (a discrete distribution) on the basis 
of a continuous variable.  The object is to prove that: 
 
)ˆ()1()ˆ(
)ˆ()ˆ|Pr(
rfrf
rf
rguilty
ng
g


  
Whitman and I strongly suspected that someone had already proven this 
result or one very close to it.  But since we did not find such a proof, we 
devised a proof of our own, which, however, did not make it into the 
published version.  I reproduce it here verbatim. 
 
Suppose ]ˆ,ˆ[   rrr .  Applying Bayes’ Rule, the conditional 
probability of guilt is given by: 
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Take the limit of both sides of our conditional probability: 
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Apply L’Hôpital’s Rule to find: 
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We will now need the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma.  Consider only the integral in the numerator of the above 
equation: 
 
    rr grr grr grr grr g drrfdrrfdrrfdrrfdrrf ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(  
 
Apply the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and the Chain Rule 
to show that: 
 
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(ˆˆ 

 
   rfrfdrrf ggrr g  
 
(The proof of the lemma is expanded below.)  Similarly: 
 
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(ˆˆ 

 
   rfrfdrrf nnrr n  
 
Substitute in the results of the lemma to find: 
)ˆˆ|Pr(lim
0
  rrrguilty
 
    )ˆ()ˆ()1()ˆ()ˆ( )ˆ()ˆ(lim0     rfrfrfrf rfrf nngg gg  
)ˆ()1(2)ˆ(2
)ˆ(2)ˆˆ|Pr(lim0 rfrf
rf
rrrguilty
ng
g

   
 
And thus: 
)ˆ()1()ˆ(
)ˆ()ˆ|Pr(
rfrf
rf
rguilty
ng
g


 , QED. 
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Further details on the Lemma.  Before taking derivatives, we had: 
    rr grr grr g drrfdrrfdrrf ˆˆˆˆˆˆ )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(  
Let  ry ˆ  and  rz ˆ .  Then we have: 
  zr gyr grr g drrfdrrfdrrf ˆˆˆˆ )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(  
Apply the Chain Rule to each term on the right to get: 

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
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
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
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
   zdrrfzydrrfydrrf
z
r g
y
r g
r
r g ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(  
Apply the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus to each term on the right to 
get: 
 


 


   zzfyyfdrrf ggrr g )()()ˆ(ˆˆ  
Substitute in  ry ˆ  and  rz ˆ , along with their derivatives with 
respect to  , to get: 
 
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(ˆˆ 

 
   rfrfdrrf ggrr g  
which is the lemma’s conclusion. 
 
